s.92 (guarantee of freedom accorded to interstate trade) and s. 117 (prohibition of dis crimination on grounds of residence in other States). As well, there was a steady and decisive expansion of the rules of procedural justice (formerly known as 'natural jus tice') in the field of administrative law. This has been seen as a response to the pre vious increase in the range of powers and discretions vested in administrative agencies, resulting in the establishment of a 'unifying principle that decision makers whose de cisions could cause loss of any kind should adopt fair procedures'. This was thought to be 'justified and appropriate as a proper check against oppressive government power' (Finklestein, 1996:62) .
The developments on procedural justice included the controversial use made of international agreements as a means of enlivening the application of the same rules even though the agreements were not given the force of domestic law by the parlia ment.
Important changes occurred in the criminal law as regards the rights of defendants (for example, to legal representation in serious criminal trials); doctrines of estoppel; and unjust enrichment and restitution. It has been said that those changes illustrated the concern of the Court with the concepts of fairness or fair dealing or reasonable ness in the relationships of citizen to government and citizen to citizen. An underlying view of reasonableness showed itself also in die trend towards making all cases in tort depend on intention or negligence (Jackson, 1996:24) ; Priesdey, 1996:99-100) . This involved die reversal of a number of long-standing cases including a case which had stood for 126 years in favour of strict liability for die escape of dangerous diings.
An important contribudon made by die Mason Court to die development of odier areas of die law which govern dealings as between citizens was die treatment of fair dealing and good faidi. This was illustrated by the increasing application of equi table doctrines to contracts and commercial law (see Rcnard, 1996) . The beginnings of diese developments pre-dated die period under review and were also accompanied by legislative changes (such as the enactment of the Trade Practices Act and corre sponding State and Territory legislation) which gave the courts greater powers to grant remedies against unfair dealings, especially in the field of consumer transactions, while apparently falling short of adopting the American concept of good faith as an essential element of the law of contract Australian courts have historically enjoyed the jurisdiction possessed by the Eng lish Court of Chancery to set aside contracts on the grounds of fraud, misrepresenta tion, breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence and unconscionable conduct How ever, what made the application noteworthy under the Mason Court was the greater willingness of the courts to exercise the jurisdiction and to continue to develop the doctrines which regulate its exercise. This had a very significant impact on the law of contract. T he High Court's approach to unconscionable conduct has been to prevent the enforcement of contractual bargains where this would lead to an unfair or uncon scionable result It has also enabled die courts to enforce die promises or reasonable expectadons of parties to a commercial transacdon, notwidistanding any technical dif ficulties which might odierwise have prevented diis taking place.
These developments prompt some reflecdons on die era under discussion and the state of judicial law-making by the dme Sir Anthony Mason redred from die C ourt
Achievements of the Mason Court
By the time Sir Anthony Mason became Chief Jusdce, die process of ending appeals to die Privy Council had been completed as a result of the Australia Acts 1986, as had the establishment of die mechanism which ensures diat all appeals heard by die High Court now lie in die discredon of die C ourt That said, it is difficult to avoid die im pression diat die Mason Court favoured a degree of judicial aedvism. Many of die developments which occurred bear die hallmarks of Sir Anthony Mason's judicial philosophy (which itself underwent considerable change during his long period in of fice as a judge).* 1 1 Sir Andiony rarely found himself in dissent A progressive attitude. The Mason Court was progressive at a dme of great and ac celerating social and economic change (Saunders, 1996:2) . Its willingness to embrace technological change is illustrated by its decision in M cKinney v The Queen when die majority changed die rules relating to die admissibility in criminal trials of confessions 
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The less activist approach which he formerly supported is illustrated by the cases decided in the early 1980s, discussed by die Chief Justice o f die Soudi Australian Supreme Court, John Doyle (1996:90-1); see also Kirby (1996) . T h e change may perhaps be attributed to a heightened disillu sionment widi die effectiveness o f die legislative process as a means o f effecting necessary changes in the law.
obtained from persons under interrogation while in police custody, by treating them as unsafe if they were not recorded on videotape.
The same willingness to respond to changes in community perceptions is illustrated by R v L when it was boldly asserted that, if it ever was part of the common law that marriage constituted continuing con sent to sexual intercourse, it was no longer so in m odem times.
Yet the Court failed to embrace the new approaches to the rules of private international law recom mended by Law Reform Commissions and academic writers. Significandy, this was one die few areas where Mason CJ lacked the necessary support of the rest of the Court for departing from the tradidonally accepted rules.
A n accessible style. The Mason Court abandoned the 'formalistic' and 'legalistic' style of judicial reasoning in favour of a more accessible style, even if diis runs the risk of exposing the Court to greater criticism when it relies on policy considerations which are no longer hidden by the veil of legalism. This development seems to indicate that the Court might now have accepted the suggestion made long ago, namely, that 'the ground rules for principled (judicial) decision-making are exacdy the same as those for the intelligent discussion of any issue' (Evans, 1976:68) .
A n Australian approach. The Mason Court is thought to have developed a distincdy Australian approach to its development of die law. The heavy if not exclusive reliance on English sources of law has now given way to a more varied willingness to consider sources of law in odier countries for non-binding guidance and assistance. The devel opment began before the elevation of Sir Andiony as Chief Justice and represents the achievement of a kind of national maturity which is the delayed but inevitable result of the formal attainment of Australian political and judicial independence.
Protecting the individual. For die audior, perhaps die most important aspect of die Court's work during diis period has been its concern for protecting the individual against die abuse of private and public power. Sir Anthony Mason and die Court as a whole obviously felt diat die Court has a very significant and appropriate role to play in dealing widi die rights of individuals: a role that does not necessarily presuppose die existence of a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights. His Honour had suggested that the degree to which a decision was 'determinative of die rights or interests of an individual' was a leading criterion for determining whedier a decision should be the subject of judicial review (Mason, 1989:124) .
Equitable rules. So far as private law is concerned, it is questionable whedier die courts should extend die reach of equitable rules in relation to commercial transac tions where die parties can be expected to have access to legal advice and enjoy equal bargaining power, leaving aside die transactions which involve small business and con sumers. There is die further need to strike an appropriate balance between fairness, on die one hand, and on die odier, certainty and predictability in commercial transac tions. Some will also question die ability, as well as die need, for judges to fix stan dards in die market place for such parties. They will ask why die same parties should as a rule be able to use a valuable public resource -die court system -to arbitrate their commercial disputes.
Public law. In die field of public law, die Mason Court become increasingly occupied widi restrictions on legislative power which are not concerned widi die federal nature of die Constitution. As a former Commonwealdi Solicitor-General, Sir Maurice By ers QC, observed, if anything characterised die Mason Court it was die implicit rejec tion of an aspect of die landmark decision in the Engineers case which strongly af firmed diat the ballot box was die only answer to potential abuse of power exercised by the majority in parliament. This is consistent with Sir Andiony Mason's view that 'our evolving concept of die democratic process' was 'moving beyond an exclusive emphasis on parliamentary supremacy and majority will' and as embracing 'a notion of responsible government which respect(ed) die fundamental rights and dignity of the individual...' (Mason, 1987:163) .
Mabo. The Mabo case raises interesting parallels widi die landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in Brown v Board o f Education regarding the desegregation of public schools. The protection accorded to native tide consists of the inability of die Commonwealdi to legislate for the acquisition of native tide without the provision of 'just terms' (diat is, compensation), and also the inability of the States to legislate in respect ol native tide odierwise dian in accordance widi die terms of die Racial Dis crimination Act 1975 (Cdi) and Native "fide Act 1993 (Cth) by reason of s.109 of the Constitution.
One rationale that is sometimes advanced for die developments which began widi and groups who are denied real access to the political process. Perhaps a similar ex planation can be advanced in relation to the High Court's solution to the native title question. The pursuit of this approach does achieve very valuable results at least in the short term and the decision of the Court in Mabo certainly did have the effect of breaking a difficult political and legislative log-jam on the Aboriginal land rights ques tion. But to adopt, in the words of Mr Jackson QC (1996:25) , 'reasoning' which 'did not follow earlier perceptions of the effect of European settlement' comes at a consid erable cost, as is illustrated by the torrent of virulent criticism unleashed against its de cision in that case and also the even more virulent (but with far less justification) criti cism unleashed against the succeeding case in Wik.
The fact that, as Sir Anthony Mason (1996:114) observed, the Australian High Court did for the indigenous inhabi tants of Australia only what the courts in the United States, New Zealand and Canada did for their indigenous peoples is unlikely to calm the voice of the critics in Australia. The adoption of the rationale adverted to above also has die potential to make the courts a potential dumping ground for issues which are too hot for politicians to han dle. In the audior's view, it is extremely doubtful whedier courts should act to upset traditional understandings of die law in advance of public opinion or where significant sections of the community are divided on die need for a change in the law.
Section 92. The praise accorded to die decision in Cole v Whitfield is well deserved (Zincs, 1995) . The case adopts an interpretation which probably and more closely reflects die intendons of die framers when they resolved to provide diat 'trade, com merce, and intercourse among die states ... shall be absolutely free' in s.92 of die Consdtudon. This was done in a unanimous judgment, 'the most important parts' of which were said, by the present Chief Jusdce, to have been written by Sir Anthony Mason (Brennan, 1996a: 13) . In diat judgment die Court adopted a free-trade (federal) approach to die interpretadon of diat secdon (aimed at die eliminadon of protccdonism in a common market). This had die effect of abandoning die mis placed Jaissez faire view of die secdon which had prevailed since the Bank Nationali sation case was decided in 1949 when legislation to nationalise private banking was held to violate s.92 despite die absence of any suggestion diat die legislation discrimi nated against interstate banking.
The Court was able to clarify die interpretation of one of the most litigated sections of die Constitution even if the unanimity of die Court was disturbed shortly afterwards in die application of the new test in relation to die taxation of interstate trade and commerce.
As Emeritus Professor Zincs (1995:18) correcdy points out, the effect of the new test will be to increase die scope of bodi Commonwealth and State power to regulate and control trade and commerce. If so, it will not be the first time that the Court has interpreted the Constitution in a way that expands governmental power at a time when the governments then in office show the least signs of exercising that power. This occurred, for example, with the effect of the Engineers ' case on the scope of die Commonwcaldi's legislative powers. The conservative Bruce Government showed little interest in realising the full potential of those powers during the 1920s (Sawer, 1956:329; Zines, 1992a:75-6) . The same can obviously be said about die ability of governments to nationalise banks and other forms of trade and commerce at die present time. But the Court's new approach will at least have the effect of restricting die destructive potential of s.92 to invalidate legis lation which deals widi die control and taxation of trade and commerce including such matters as the marketing of primary products and transportation of goods and per sons.
Professor Zines (1995) has righdy praised die Court's tendency to prefer sub stance over form in its new-found willingness to give greater effect to constitutional restrictions on legislative power (such as s. 117 of die Constitution). The earlier ten dency to give restrictions on power a restrictive, narrow and formal operation was probably symptomatic of die lingering influence of die British doctrine of parliamen tary supremacy.
The Court's willingness to depart from die previous interpretations of s.92 was not matched by its reluctance to disturb the wide view taken of die meaning of excise in s.90 under which die States are excluded from imposing a wide range of taxes on die production, manufacture and distribution of goods. But this may be due to die policy predilections of die majority who viewed die purpose of s.90 as helping to 'create a Commonwealdi economic union and not an association of States each with 23 its own separate economy'. A majority of die present Court subsequendy adhered to the wide view of excise but in a way diat destroyed die practical significance of cer tain kinds of franchise fees on tobacco and liquor which the States had previously been able to levy under an anomalous exception to the wide view.
Im plied rights.
The A C T V case has attracted much popular interest at least for die result it achieved in recognising the existence of some kind of constitutional guarantee of die freedom of political communication which restricts legislative power and is implied as an indispensable element of die representative democracy diat is recog nised in the Australian Constitution. Perhaps one of the reasons for its general popu larity was its attractiveness to die media for the effect it had, as a result of subsequent decisions, in 'reforming,' on a uniform basis diroughout Australia, die law on defama tion so to facilitate die discussion of political matters. Attempts to achieve reform in this area by means of cooperation between Australian government and parliaments have proved to be singularly unsuccessful.
More recently, in the Lange case the Mason Court decisions on defamation were accepted as authority for deciding that the law on defamation as previously interpreted failed to conform widi the freedom in question. But the law was brought into con formity with the Constitution in a different way from that suggested by die earlier de cisions, aldiough diis seems to have produced substantially similar results to diose achieved in the earlier defamation cases even if those results do not stem direedy from 26 the operadon of die constitutional freedom.
W hat has concerned some legal commentators is not die utility of die results de scribed above but radier die judicial vehicle used to bring diem about Judicial impli cations from the structure of die Constitution, for example in relation to federalism and die separation of judicial from legislative and executive powers, are not new. W hat was new about the process of implying restrictions on legislative power from die representative nature of the governmental institutions created by die Constitution was the fact diat such implications had die potential to defeat die acknowledged intentions of die framers of die Australian Constitution not to adopt a Bill of Rights. The ortho dox understanding was diat in diat respect Australia remained more closely aligned widi British notions of constitutional law, under which as Dawson J was to point out 'die guarantee of fundamental freedoms' did not lie in 'any constitutional mandate but in die capacity of a democratic society to preserve for itself its own shared values'. This gives rise to serious doubts about whedier die judges enjoy a democratic mandate to give effect to an implied Bill of Rights, as well as die usual concerns about die use of implications as a vehicle forjudges giving expression to dicir own subjective values.
Some of diese concerns may be alleviated by Sir Anthony Mason's acknowledg ment diat in view of die decision of die framers to eschew die American model of a Bill of Rights 'it is difficult if not impossible to establish a foundation for die implica tion of general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms'. The implication he supported was confined to strengthening die workings of representative democracy. This would help to perfect die integrity of die process by which decisions are made radier dian determine die outcomes which emerge from diat process.
Not all judges were or would be content to limit die process of implication in diis way. Quite apart from die inherent potential of a freedom of political communication to embrace odier important freedoms such as freedom of movement, association and assembly, die concept of representative democracy might be seen to extend to other 
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As Professor Zincs (1991:34-5) has indicated, 'provisions concerned with the establishment and maintenance o f democratic processes appear, to some degree, to shade into those wliich are thought basic rights which arc not restricted to ensuring the genuine and effective nature of the election process. As well, some judges have in the past suggested that equality is nec essarily implied from the Constitution even though the framers explicitly refused to include diis right in die Constitution: which is true also of die implied constitutional inability of die Commonwealdi parliament to create retrospecdve criminal offence.
Admittedly, die chances of a majority accepdng die implication of equality seem gready diminished given die Court's rejection in die recent case which involved the removal of Aboriginal children from dieir families.
Moreover, a majority of die Bench as presendy composed seems to be opposed to die use of general concepts such as representative democracy as free-standing principles which operate independendy of diose provisions, when diose concepts are only partially recognised in die ex press provisions of die Constitution; diat is, as a reason for invalidating legislation which does not otherwise breach die express provisions of die Constitution.
Refer ence has already been made to die decisions of die present Court which may be taken to have consolidated radier dian extended previous developments; but generalisations can be hazardous given die surprising case of Kable v Director o f Public Prosecutions (NSW)
where a majority of die Court has begun to extend some aspects of the separation of judicial powers case into die State judicial sphere.
Concluding Remarks
It has been said diat die end of die Mason Court era coincided widi a vigorous debate about die limits of judicial creativity in Australia. It was also said that die debate clearly reflected die reputation earned by die Mason Court especially during die latter part of the former Chief Justice's tenure as a court of final jurisdiction which gave effect to a conscious philosophy of judicial activism (Sackville, 1997:145-6 ). Many leading members of die Australian judiciary have acknowledged diat judges make law as a re sult of die inevitable choices which confront diem in die decision-making process (see for example Doyle, 1996; Sackville, 1997; Kirby, 1983) . The present Chief Justice of the High Court said:
In m odem times the function of the courts in developing the common law has been freely acknowledged. The reluctance of the courts in earlier times to acknowledge that function was due in part to the theory that it was the ex clusive function of the legislature to keep the law in a serviceable state. But legislatures have disappointed the theorists and the courts have been left with a substantial part of the responsibility for keeping die law in a serviceable state, a function which calls for consideration of die contemporary values of the community.
The nodon of ensuring diat the law is kept in a 'serviceable state' is particularly appli cable to what might be termed 'lawyers law' in die areas of law such as torts and con tracts. Parliaments may well assume diat die courts will develop in an orderly manner die law in diose areas safe in die knowledge diat any unwanted results of diat devel opment can if necessary be reversed by overriding legisladon. The assumption here is also that courts do not change die law on matters which divide die community. Even in die area of 'lawyer's law,' however, it is important for die courts to develop tech niques to ensure diat die expectadons of persons who plan dieir affairs in reliance on previous case law are not defeated. The difficulty widi the judicial acknowledgment of law-making by judges is, however, diat, as Professor Brian Galligan has corrccdy pointed out, die judiciary may have failed to prepare die public for diat acknowledg ment.
Public understanding would not be assisted by die acceptance of a literal and oversimplified version of die doctrine of die separation of powers.
Sir Gerard Brennan has attempted to confine die acknowledgment of judicial law making to die development of die common law (as distinct from die interpretation of die Constitution) and also to stress, as odiers have, diat judges make law in a very different way from diat of die political branches of die government. He emphasised diat 'die development of die substantive principles of law by die High Court must be die outcome of die application of die judicial m ethod to die cases diat come before it' (Brennan, 1996b:264; emphasis added) .
J Jie attempt to confine die acknowledgment of judicial law-making to the devel opment of die common law and so deny its application to die interpretation of die Constitution is curious. While undoubtedly deriving some theoretical support from democratic considerations, it will be difficult in practice for a court not 'to make law' and dius have regard to policy considerations, in any area of die law including consti tutional law, at least when diose consideration are used in the same special and con ' fined sense that will be explained below. This is because of the necessary brevity and open nature of constitutional provisions which call for interpretation.
Sir Gerard Brennan's attempt to emphasise the use of the 'judicial method' is more persuasive. For him, the scope of judicial policy, as distinct from political policy, is informed by precedent and disciplined by analogy; and these factors confine the scope for discretionary judgement (Brennan, 1996a: 13) . Sir Anthony Mason stressed the place of the strong traditions of consistency, coherence and continuity in the or derly development of the law. Judicial decision-making was seen as principled and reasoned, in contrast to political decision-making which involves compromise and expediency. Moreover, the need to resolve disputes between the parties before the court necessitates closer attention to the interests of individuals since it is concerned with die particular, whereas political decision-making is much more concerned widi die general. The differences also go to procedure and mediod in diat judges are bound to hear die interested parties and give public reasons for dieir decisions. They are also required to deal widi problems raised by lidgants while polidcians are free to decline to deal widi problems raised for dieir decision (Sturgess & Chubb, 1988:346-7) .
A final f actor is diat courts can decide only the cases that come before them and cannot on dieir own inidadve decide issues in die absence of lidgadon which involves their determinadon. As well, in Australia die ability of federal courts to render advi sory opinions is restricted. The significance of diese factors should not be exaggerated since, as a final court of appeal, the High Court has a high degree of control over the cases which it chooses to hear under die special leave process. In addidon judges can signal dieir interest in certain issues in a way diat may encourage legal advisers to rec ommend die inidadon of lidgadon which will raise diose issues. Some consdtudonal cases also have a suspicious similarity widi advisory opinions, given the willingness of die High Court to entertain in some cases challenges to die validity of legisladon be fore it comes into force.
If judicial law-making is now accepted by judges of Australian courts, or at least diose at die appellate level, some difficult issues remain regarding die way diis role is to be performed in die f uture, as was clearly demonstrated by Doyle CJ (1996) of die South Australian Supreme Court. His H onour believed diat the work of die Mason Court would come to be regarded as marking a significant development in Australian legal diinking and judicial techniques. It has prepared Australian courts for a new ap proach to dieir law-making function. But awaiting its successors were die tasks of de fining more clearly die limits between die law-making role of the Courts and diat of parliament; clarifying and expounding die judicial techniques which support die law making function; and refining die procedures of die Court to enable die funedon to be carried out in die best possible way. The warnings are dmely and he is not the only judge to have issued them (see for example Sackville, 1997) . In relation to the function of courts to keep 'the law in a serviceable state', Chief Justice Doyle (1996:93-4 ) has pointed to the significant distinction between the need for changes generally and the need for those changes to be brought about by judicial action. Searching questions are raised as to whether the reasons given by the High Court in such cases as Mabo sufficiently addressed that distinction. This was so in the latter case despite the fact that it is seen by some as coining very close to 'the boundary between the appropriate roles of the legislature and the judiciary' (Jackson, 1996:25) and also that the practical impact of the decision was such that an urgent legislative response was required since it was widely agreed that the impact of the decision could not be left to be sorted out in accordance with common law principles on a case-bycase basis. The legislation in question was to have very significant political, social and economic consequences (Doyle, 1996:93) .
The procedures adopted by the Court to carry out its law-making function will need to address the tendency of judges in the modem era to resort to community val ues and perceptions as a reason for changing the law. They will also need to address the associated need for more systematic materials to be placed before the courts in relation to such matters. Changed social, political and economic conditions are le gitimate factors which call for changing judge-made law. Yet the use made of such values is obviously not free from danger, especially as some judges could smuggle their own subjective values under the guise of perceived community standards, and arriving at the commonality of such values is difficult in an increasingly multicultural society. Sir Anthony Mason is probably right to reject any calls for the introduction of surveys to gauge contemporary values (1996:114); but Doyle CJ (1996:96-7) is surely right to insist on more systematic materials being placed before the Court for this purpose.
In a recent case the Court may have failed to keep the law up to date when it re fused to accept the right of patients to obtain copies of their medical records Respite Canadian judicial developments which affirmed the existence of such a right, and despite die acknowledgment by two members of die Court diat a majority of die community would support such a right A liberal approach may also need to be adoptecHn relation to the exercise of die power to allow for the intervention of third parties.
Another technique which deserves greater attention is the possibility of a court engaging in prospective overruling so as to ensure diat when previous cases are overruled the effects of die establishment of any new rules are confined to the future and to the immediate parties in die litigation which gives rise to the new rules. Its full acceptance probably calls for die demise of the lingering remnants of the declaratory theory of law. The technique, however, seemed to receive short shrift in die recent Ha case on s.90 where it was rejected by bodi die majority and the minority on the ground that prospective overruling was inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power, despite the absence of any discussion of the tentative steps that^may have been taken in that direction before die decision of die Court in die H r case.
In 1921, a famous American judge, Benjamin Cardozo, lucidly analysed the question of judicial law-making in a way diat fully and freely accepted its existence. But he accepted diat for pracdcal reasons, if nothing else, adherence to precedent should be the rule and not die exception. Cardozo (1978:112-13 ) summarised the process of judicial law-making as requiring courts to have regard to four factors: (i) logical progression (mainly inductive radier than deducdve as involving law-making by analogy); (ii) historical development and cvoludon; (iii) the customs, morals and tradidons (including the accepted standards of 'right' conduct) of a society; and (iv) social udlity or welfare. Courts and die legal community generally have yet to improve on this test in elaboradng die limits of judicial law-making.
The challenge for the modem judge remains, in die words of Jusdce Michael Kirby (1997:11) , to 'find where die line lies in a particular case, at a particular dme and place'. As indicated by Professor Saunders (1996:8) , the most significant issue for die judiciary here and around die world 'is the difficult and delicate task of finding an aj> propriate balance between the functions of die courts and die odier arms of govern ment' particularly in age 'in which die assumpdons of majoritarian representadve de mocracy have been eroded from bodi inside and out widiout die full ramifications of the change being , as yet, fully explored or understood'. That said, '(t)he legacy of the Mason Court is a useful base from which to start' to resolve such issues.
